Podcasts de historia

El moderado

El moderado

Durante la Guerra Civil inglesa, los radicales como John Lilburne, Richard Overton, William Walwyn, Edward Sexby y John Wildman fueron descritos como niveladores. Publicaron folletos como Una protesta de muchos miles de ciudadanos (1646), Una flecha contra todos los tiranos (1646), La libertad del hombre libre reivindicada (1647), Juramentos impetuosos (1647) y Un acuerdo del pueblo (1647).

En julio de 1648, los Levellers comenzaron a publicar su propio periódico, El moderado. Editado por Overton, alentó polémicamente a los soldados del Nuevo Ejército Modelo a rebelarse. Los artículos escritos por Overton eran más radicales que los escritos contemporáneos de otros líderes de Leveler. Mientras que radicales como Lilburne se opusieron al juicio y la ejecución de Carlos I, por ejemplo, Overton lo apoyó como necesario para asegurar las libertades inglesas.

En marzo de 1649, Lilburne, Wildman, Overton y Walwyn fueron arrestados y acusados ​​de defender el comunismo. Después de ser llevados ante el Consejo de Estado, fueron enviados a la Torre de Londres. Con sus líderes en prisión, dejó de publicarse en septiembre de 1649.

Este día llevaron a James Thompson al cementerio. La muerte era un gran terror para él, como para la mayoría. Algunos dicen que tenía esperanzas de un perdón y, por lo tanto, entregó algo que reflejaba la legalidad de su compromiso y la justa mano de Dios sobre él; pero si lo hizo, le fallaron. El cabo Perkins fue el siguiente; El lugar de la muerte, y la vista de sus verdugos, estaba tan lejos de alterar su semblante, o desanimar su espíritu, que pareció sonreír a ambos, y considerar que era una gran misericordia que tuviera que morir por esta pelea, y echarse a perder. los ojos hacia su Padre y luego hacia sus compañeros de prisión (que estaban de pie sobre los conductos de la iglesia para ver la ejecución), apoyó la espalda contra la pared y ordenó a los verdugos que dispararan; y así murió tan valientemente como vivió religiosamente. Después de él, el Maestro John Church fue llevado a la hoguera, Dios lo apoyó tanto en esta gran agonía como este último; porque después de haberse quitado el jubón, extendió los brazos y ordenó a los soldados que cumplieran con sus deberes, mirándolos a la cara, hasta que le dispararon, sin el menor temor o terror. Así fue la muerte, el fin de su presente gozo y el comienzo de su futura felicidad eterna. Henry Denne fue llevado al lugar de ejecución, dijo, era más digno de muerte que de vida y se mostró algo arrepentido, por ser motivo de este compromiso; pero aunque dijo esto para salvar su vida, los dos últimos ejecutados, no lo habrían dicho, aunque estaban seguros de obtener su perdón.

Tácticas militares en la guerra civil (comentario de respuesta)

Mujeres en la Guerra Civil (Respuesta al comentario)


Moderados: ¿Quiénes son y qué quieren?

El centro estadounidense está vivo y sano y está en manos de ambos partidos políticos.

A menudo parece que ya no hay un centro en la política estadounidense. Los campos cada vez más polarizados de derecha e izquierda mantienen puntos de vista diametralmente opuestos e irreconciliables sobre aparentemente todos los temas.

Y, sin embargo, más de un tercio de los votantes estadounidenses se consideran a sí mismos ni liberales ni conservadores, sino moderados, lo que indica una parte sustancial de disidentes del paradigma izquierda-derecha. ¿Están simplemente confundidos? ¿Son ideólogos encubiertos con opiniones fuertemente partidistas pero disgusto por las etiquetas? ¿Están desconectados políticamente? ¿Cuál es, en resumen, su trato?

La gente de Third Way, un grupo de expertos demócratas que insta a posiciones moderadas, decidió averiguarlo. Encargaron una encuesta a 1.500 votantes estadounidenses registrados, haciendo preguntas detalladas sobre una variedad de temas para averiguar si aquellos que se llamaban a sí mismos moderados eran un grupo distinto y qué los distingue. El encuestador demócrata Peter Brodnitz del Benenson Strategy Group llevó a cabo la encuesta inaugural "State of the Center" el mes pasado y tiene un margen de error general de 2,5 puntos porcentuales en cualquier dirección.

Lo que encontró la encuesta es fascinante. Los moderados, según la encuesta, no están desconectados ni mal informados, pero tienden a ver ambos lados de problemas complejos; por ejemplo, quieren que el gobierno haga más para ayudar a la economía, pero les preocupa que pueda ser ineficaz o contraproducente. Ven a ambos partidos como demasiado ideológicos y desearían que los políticos se comprometieran más. Una mayoría son demócratas, pero se ven a sí mismos como un poco de centroderecha ideológicamente, y un tercio dice que votan por igual por demócratas y republicanos. Y son sorprendentemente jóvenes y diversos: los que se describen a sí mismos como moderados representan una pluralidad del 44 por ciento de votantes hispanos y no blancos y una pluralidad del 42 por ciento de la generación del Milenio.

"Los moderados luchan con, y a menudo rechazan, lo que ven como las opciones ideológicas falsas que definen la política moderna", escribieron Michelle Diggles y Lanae Erickson Hatalsky, dos funcionarios de la Tercera Vía, en un memorando sobre la encuesta, que se proporcionó exclusivamente para El Atlántico antes de su lanzamiento el jueves. "Reconocen que ambos lados tienen una parte de la verdad y ven fallas en las perspectivas liberales y conservadoras estándar".

La encuesta proporciona una hoja de ruta para ambas partes a medida que perfeccionan sus mensajes. Para los demócratas, muestra que el partido tendrá dificultades para ganar si cambia a un tono liberal consciente de sí mismo: solo el 38 por ciento de los demócratas se ve a sí mismo como liberal, mientras que el 37 por ciento se considera moderado y otro 25 por ciento se considera conservador. (Ya he escrito sobre esta dinámica antes). Para los republicanos, muestra que hay un grupo de votantes indecisos escépticos del gran gobierno que podrían estar abiertos al mensaje del partido, pero solo si el Partido Republicano descarta parte de su dura retórica hacia los desfavorecidos. .

Fuente: Estado del Centro, Third Way y Benenson Strategy Group, 2014

La encuesta encuentra que el 40 por ciento de los moderados se consideran demócratas, mientras que solo el 21 por ciento son republicanos y el 39 por ciento son independientes. (Este hallazgo concuerda con la sabiduría convencional de un Partido Republicano cuyo conservadurismo cada vez más doctrinario ha alienado a gran parte de la mitad del electorado). Aproximadamente una cuarta parte de los moderados dicen que siempre votan por candidatos demócratas, y otro 18 por ciento lo hace la mayoría de las veces 9. el por ciento de los moderados siempre vota por candidatos republicanos, mientras que el 12 por ciento vota por republicanos con más frecuencia que los demócratas. Un sólido 33 por ciento son votantes indecisos que dicen que votan por igual por demócratas y republicanos.

La perspectiva de los moderados sobre el papel del gobierno tiene elementos en común tanto con los liberales como con los conservadores. Solo el 23 por ciento de los moderados favorece un gobierno más grande que brinde más servicios (en comparación con el 54 por ciento de los liberales y el 13 por ciento de los conservadores), el 37 por ciento está a favor de un gobierno más pequeño con menos servicios (en comparación con el 12 por ciento de los liberales y el 62 por ciento de los conservadores).

Fuente: Estado del Centro, Third Way y Benenson Strategy Group, 2014

A los liberales les preocupa abrumadoramente (75 por ciento) que el gobierno no se involucre lo suficiente en la economía, mientras que a los conservadores en su mayoría (60 por ciento) les preocupa que el gobierno esté demasiado involucrado en la economía.Los moderados se inclinan hacia el lado liberal del argumento, y el 53 por ciento dice que no hay suficiente participación para 40 por ciento que citan demasiado. Aún así, más moderados temen al gran gobierno (52 por ciento) que a las grandes empresas (41 por ciento). Dos tercios de los moderados piensan que el gobierno a menudo se interpone en el camino del crecimiento económico, y una mayoría (54 por ciento) piensa que si el gobierno está involucrado en algo, a menudo sale mal.

Sobre los temas, los moderados a menudo ven virtudes en los argumentos de ambos lados. Una gran mayoría (84 por ciento) quiere más verificaciones de antecedentes para los compradores de armas, pero el 58 por ciento dice que nuestras leyes de armas actuales son "suficientes para protegerme a mí ya mi comunidad". Tres cuartas partes quieren expandir la exploración nacional de carbón, petróleo y gas natural, pero casi el 90 por ciento quiere invertir más en energía renovable. El setenta y seis por ciento está de acuerdo en que es inmoral "dejar a nuestros hijos en un país con una deuda de 17 billones de dólares", pero el 72 por ciento está de acuerdo en que "necesitamos aumentar las inversiones en infraestructura y educación en lugar de preocuparnos por la deuda a largo plazo".

En cuanto a inmigración y seguridad nacional, sin embargo, los moderados están en su mayoría en un lado del problema: el 86 por ciento de los moderados ven a los inmigrantes indocumentados como personas trabajadoras que tratan de cuidar a sus familias, y una pequeña mayoría no está de acuerdo con la idea de que otorgarles la ciudadanía "recompensaría" mal comportamiento ", del 50 al 47 por ciento. Mientras tanto, al 72 por ciento le preocupa que el gobierno vaya demasiado lejos al monitorear el uso de teléfonos e Internet, y la mayoría dice que no les preocupa que no estemos haciendo lo suficiente para detener el próximo ataque terrorista en suelo estadounidense.

En cuestiones de pobreza y oportunidades, los moderados se preocupan por los obstáculos estructurales al sueño americano, pero no se ven a sí mismos como víctimas. Solo el 28 por ciento de los moderados está de acuerdo en que la discriminación contra las minorías raciales es cosa del pasado, en comparación con el 18 por ciento de los liberales y el 43 por ciento de los conservadores. Cuatro de cada 10 moderados piensan que las personas son pobres principalmente porque han tomado malas decisiones, una cuarta parte de los liberales cree esto, mientras que el 60 por ciento de los conservadores lo cree.

La mayoría de los moderados creen que el gobierno debería desempeñar un papel en la creación de igualdad de oportunidades y que una red de seguridad sólida es importante incluso si "algunas personas perezosas juegan con el sistema", pero los moderados también creen en gran medida que el gobierno ha creado incentivos para que los pobres no trabajen. Lo más interesante es que, incluso cuando ven a la sociedad como desigual, siete de cada diez moderados no están de acuerdo con la idea de que "la baraja está en contra de gente como yo". De hecho, eran los conservadores quienes tenían más probabilidades de verse a sí mismos como víctimas: el 35 por ciento dijo que la baraja estaba en su contra, frente al 28 por ciento de los liberales y moderados.

Fuente: Estado del Centro, Third Way y Benenson Strategy Group, 2014

Los moderados ven a ambos partidos como demasiado ideológicos (dicen que los demócratas son demasiado liberales y los republicanos demasiado conservadores) y están angustiados por la naturaleza dura del discurso político moderno, más probable que los liberales o conservadores digan que evitan las conversaciones políticas porque son demasiado divisivos. . Pero no están desconectados: solo el 35 por ciento dice que se desconecta de la política, más o menos lo mismo que los liberales y conservadores.

Los investigadores de la Tercera Vía son lo que podría denominarse partidarios de la moderación: la importancia de los moderados en política es su razón de ser, y tienen un interés evidente en reforzar esa noción. Pero esta encuesta proporciona evidencia convincente de que están en lo cierto. De hecho, hay un segmento importante del electorado que no pertenece firmemente a ninguno de los campos ideológicos, y es distinto en sus ideas y simpatías de los liberales o los conservadores. El éxito de los demócratas en las recientes elecciones nacionales se puede atribuir a la mayor resonancia de sus argumentos entre los votantes en el medio. Pero los republicanos podrían recuperarlos con un mensaje más centrista, y los demócratas podrían perderlos si se desvían demasiado hacia la izquierda.


Las diferentes facciones republicanas de la reconstrucción

Más específicamente, las facciones republicanas de la reconstrucción fueron:

  • Republicanos radicales exigió derechos civiles para los libertos (esclavos liberados), como medidas para garantizar su derecho al voto (sufragio negro, o hoy en & # 8220PC, & # 8221 sufragio negro). Los republicanos radicales estuvieron a la vanguardia defendiendo varias Leyes de Reconstrucción, Enmiendas de Reconstrucción y la limitación de los derechos políticos y de voto de los ex funcionarios civiles confederados, oficiales militares y soldados. Si algo le da a & # 8220Military Reconstruction & # 8221 su nombre, son las políticas lideradas por los radicales. Los radicales fueron la facción que lideró la lucha contra el unionista sureño demócrata por la guerra Andrew Johnson (quien asumió la presidencia después de que Lincoln fuera asesinado la semana que terminó la Guerra Civil). Los radicales finalmente lideraron la acusación que debilitó a Johnson y casi lo llevó a su juicio político (que fracasó por un voto en el Senado en 1868 después de aprobar la Cámara). En la década de 1860 & # 8217, los republicanos radicales no eran & # 8217t el Tea Party tanto como eran & # 8220 progresistas & # 8221 Guerreros de la Justicia Social del Norte. Querían derechos para todos los hombres y querían ver colgados a los líderes confederados del sur de Georgia y Carolina del Sur por su traición y crímenes contra la humanidad. Estoy usando la retórica a propósito para hacer un punto. No eran los republicanos de hoy en ese sentido. Vea una descripción general del Plan Republicano Radical para la Reconstrucción. [5]
  • Republicanos conservadores tomó la postura totalmente opuesta a sus contrapartes radicales. Simpatizaban con los ex confederados más moderados que pronto volverían a ser demócratas. Querían perdonar a los confederados y restaurar la Unión. Durante la Reconstrucción y la Edad Dorada, se puede decir que algunos republicanos conservadores se convirtieron en lo que llamamos demócratas Redeemer, Carpetbagger y Scallywag. Este grupo también incluyó a demócratas moderados con mentalidad empresarial del Norte y del Sur. Algunos de estos conservadores habrían sido ideológicamente Free Soilers antes de la guerra. No aprobaron la esclavitud, pero no querían ir a la guerra para establecer el derecho de los nuevos estados en expansión a ser estados esclavistas. También eran los que se preocupaban más por los negocios que por las cuestiones sociales.
  • Republicanos moderados al igual que Lincoln y Grant, pueden haber tendido a ser radicales en algunos temas, después de todo, llevaron a la guerra, pero no apoyaron plenamente ni a las facciones radicales ni a las conservadoras. En cambio, mediaron entre los dos lados y las diferentes facciones de los demócratas. El republicanismo moderado se parece más a la ideología generalista federalista y whig antes de la guerra. Esos fueron los partidos que se convirtieron en republicanos. En este sentido, Alexander Hamilton, John y John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster y Henry Clay eran todos "republicanos moderados" (o federalistas o whigs en su época).

Moderado (adj.

& quot; no excesivo en cantidad, intensidad, calidad, etc. & quot; finales del 14c., originalmente de clima y otras condiciones físicas, del latín moderatus & quot; dentro de límites, observando moderación & quot; figurativamente & quot; modesta, restringida, & quot; participio pasado de moderari & quot; regular, mitigar, restringir, temperamento, establecer una medida, mantener (algo) dentro de la medida, & quot de PIE * med-es-, de raíz * med- & quot; tomar las medidas apropiadas & quot. , de opiniones de la década de 1640, de precios de la década de 1670. Relacionado: Moderación.

principios del 15c., & quot; abatir el exceso, reducir la intensidad de & quot del latín moderatus & quot; dentro de los límites, observando la moderación & quot figurativamente & quot; modesta, restringida, & quot; participio pasado de moderari & quot; regular, mitigar, restringir, templar, establecer una medida, mantener (algo) dentro de la medida, & quot de la raíz PIE * med- & quot; tomar las medidas apropiadas. & quot; El sentido intransitivo de & quot; volverse menos violento, severo, riguroso, etc. & quot; es de la década de 1670. El significado de "presidir un debate" se atestigua por primera vez en la década de 1570. Relacionado: moderado moderado.

"alguien que tiene opiniones moderadas sobre temas controvertidos, uno que se opone a puntos de vista o cursos extremos", 1794 (Burke), de moderado (adj.). Relacionado: Moderatismo.


El moderado - Historia

Cuando las historias se expresan sobre la base de principios metafísicos, siguen líneas de cronología y determinación causal. Entonces, el problema se refiere a cómo el presente puede ser determinado por las necesidades que llegan del pasado. Pero luego hay historias que no implican metafísica; eso es lo que llamaremos historia moderada. Estos todavía están comprometidos con la realidad de lo sucedido, con la realidad de la memoria, la experiencia y los documentos. Siguen comprometidos en buscar la continuidad de esa realidad. Pero este es un tipo de realidad y continuidad completamente diferente, que es una consistencia estética, en oposición a una causalidad lineal. Esta es la continuidad de contornos y patrones.

La historia moderada se mueve en un nivel abstracto, donde ya no se ocupa de objetos, causas o posiciones determinables en el tiempo lineal. No hay presunción de tiempo lineal. En cambio, las dimensiones de tiempo y espacio son problemas que deben descubrirse en los patrones de variación de las firmas formales. Este tipo de ética resistiría cualquier historia de ficción, como las novelas realistas o los dramas históricos. Estas artes intentan apropiarse del pasado a través de las proyecciones de la imaginación subjetiva. Para resistir estas artes narrativas inmoderadas, esta ética requiere una percepción que disuelva la composición de los sujetos históricos.

Esta es una forma de interpretar la filosofía de Hegel, y en particular su estética, como un solvente que rompe las conexiones metafísicas que constituyen la subjetividad. Siempre que anuncia el fin de algo, es decir, el fin de la historia y del arte, esos no son eventos que se puedan determinar en el tiempo cronológico. Estos eventos implican más bien la disolución de la cronología lineal. El arte fue un género que surgió históricamente con su propia determinación finita, pero luego, a lo largo de su desarrollo, alcanza un umbral en el que abandona el fantasma. Este es el Aufbung donde se disuelve la determinación finita del arte. Ahí es donde el arte pasa a lo estético, que es una espiritualidad infinita y una especie de contemplación filosófica.

Los sujetos están constituidos por determinadas necesidades que asumen, ya sea como propósito, intención, creencia, servicio, responsabilidad, compromiso, sumisión, integridad, honor, hábito, costumbre, posesión, afectación o razón. El término hegeliano del género es donde este supuesto de necesidad cambia de modalidad, porque se disuelven los antiguos géneros que constituían el sujeto. Esto precipita una perversión de cómo el sujeto estaba enraizado en una situación. El sujeto sólo puede asumir el fundamento como condiciones que le sobrevienen y no puede determinar activamente los fundamentos de su propia necesidad. Así, el sujeto hegeliano se escinde en un sujeto activo que plantea el fundamento de su necesidad y un sujeto pasivo que se relaciona con ese fundamento subjetivamente desde el interior de una situación. Esta división es arriesgada, pero una vez que los viejos géneros se disuelvan, esta podría ser la única posibilidad de constitución subjetiva.

El comportamiento subjetivo adecuado anticipa una serie de correlaciones & # 8211 respuestas, propósitos, impresiones, evaluaciones, y su base en última instancia consiste en el comportamiento anticipado de otros sujetos. Esto significa que la necesidad subjetiva depende de una sociedad donde las contingencias pueden tomarse como necesidades, o donde las posibilidades pueden tomarse como probabilidades. Es así como el sujeto es capaz de extraer un mandato simbólico desde el suelo. El sujeto tiene que descubrir su fundamento en el comportamiento de otros sujetos, y en una especie de consenso social sobre cómo se separa lo necesario de lo contingente.

Esto coloca a Hegel precisamente en la intersección de Nietzsche y Bergson. El término de la historia y el arte es entonces la superación del "fue" o el espíritu de la gravedad. Esto requiere que el sujeto coloque una disyunción en su núcleo y que la disyunción siga los contornos de una duplicación claramente bergsoniana. Pero luego se convierte en una cuestión de cómo la percepción habitual puede basarse en la memoria.

Hegel se refiere a esta disyunción como una negatividad y nombra sus cinco avatares: inquietud, seriedad, sufrimiento, paciencia y trabajo. Éstas son las caras clásicas hegelianas de la disyunción. Es extraño cómo estos términos cruciales reciben tan poca atención en nuestro período contemporáneo. En cambio, tenemos otros cinco avatares de disyunción subjetiva & # 8211 historia, narrativa, memoria, trauma, experiencia. Por alguna razón, han sido estos términos los que nuestros contemporáneos se han sentido obligados a pensar sobre la preocupante disyunción en el corazón de la subjetividad.

El género de la historia se determina por algunos ejemplos en la antigua Grecia, y luego se vuelve menos determinado a medida que nos adentramos en la modernidad o nos alejamos de la civilización occidental. Hegel designa a Herodoto como modelo de historia básica. Esto quiere decir que la historia es un relato que da quien escribe como testigo del tiempo en el que vivió. En el siglo XX, hubo filósofos que lamentaron el fin de la historia, como Derrida que dijo: “Nunca he podido contar una historia”. O como Hannah Arendt, que estaba afligida porque su edad nunca podría producir un Herodoto. Porque la estéril edad moderna nunca podría producir uno como él. La inauguración de la sociedad industrial había sacrificado al ser humano clásico, junto con sus géneros de historia narrativa. Y la filosofía fue considerada responsable de este exterminio: que la edad moderna aprendió de Sócrates a ignorar los malos modales.

Pero, ¿cómo identificamos a ese Herodoto, que murió en la Revolución Francesa? Parece poco probable que el historiador chino Sima Qian sea confundido con Herodoto, esto se debe a que comienza la Gran Historia de la Dinastía Han en un modo que se parece más a la teogenia Hesiódica. Según las leyes del género, no es así como se expresan los verdaderos testigos históricos.

La génesis y la disipación de los géneros debe abordarse de manera material, como series infinitesmales & # 8217 de variaciones diminutas donde las formas se proyectan como hologramas. Estos son como el continuo cantoriano, donde a medida que aumentamos el aumento descubrimos más divergencias y variaciones, por lo que la forma en que definimos la forma de un género depende en gran medida de la escala. Entonces, no es solo una cuestión de si Sima Qian puede ser tomado como el Herodoto chino, sino también si Herodoto es incluso reconocible como él mismo. La pregunta es si la lectura de sus Historias podría expresar algunos géneros originales debido a las circunstancias contemporáneas. Parafraseando a Marx, podríamos decir que todos los géneros podrían fundirse en el aire.

El término "memoria" se destaca por su origen claramente analítico. Este fue uno de los términos principales de la psicología moderna a finales del siglo XIX. Ésa fue la época del alto positivismo, contra la que se rebelaron Nietzsche y Bergson. Pero podemos resistir esa connotación de rigor analítico, traduciendo el término como Mnemosyne, esa persona clásica que era conocida como la madre de las musas. Se trata de una alegoría del erotismo y la fecundidad, por lo que la memoria se proyecta como el origen materno donde crecen los embriones de una narrativa futura.

El término "trauma" implica el contingente más distintivo de las singularidades que jamás haya ocurrido. Aquí descubrimos el bucle más agudo entre los estratos disyuntivos de subjetividad. El sentido del término es exactamente sensible a las diferencias historiográficas. Esto tiene que ver con la historia singular de la judería europea, pero el término se ha extendido hasta convertirse en una figuración que contamina otros contextos. Esto incluye la figuración misteriosa del sobreviviente en la cultura pop estadounidense. Para descargar esta historicidad agudamente figurativa y estabilizar el significado de este término, los profesionales médicos le han asignado un sentido estrictamente técnico y diagnóstico. Esto lleva a la pregunta de si el término podría volver a ser figurativo en el futuro y comenzar a emitir nuevos patrones en la composición de la memoria histórica.

El término trauma se refiere a fallas sensibles de la representación histórica. Nombra un punto ciego de subjetividad histórica que la narrativa no logra expresar. Y alrededor de este sitio esperaríamos que se estuvieran formando las narrativas históricas del futuro. Entonces, la historia del futuro está prefigurada de alguna manera en la experiencia del trauma contemporáneo. O podríamos decir que el trauma es lo no narrado que aún espera narración.

Esto significa que la experiencia se divide en dos órdenes, que son el narrado y el no narrado. Los sujetos pueden estar inclinados a narrar todas sus experiencias, que es como las asimilan al ideal de propiedad. Entonces esto conduce a una concepción de "trabajo", que es el proceso en el que los recuerdos traumáticos se refinan en las narrativas del futuro. Esto concibe el futuro como el momento en que los límites de la narración se extenderán más. Hay límites de lo que pasa a ser narrado en algún momento, y hay una experiencia no narrada que cae más allá de esos límites. Y es la necesidad de narrar esas otras experiencias lo que impulsa la composición de nuevos géneros. Los recuerdos traumáticos solo pueden narrarse una vez que se han forjado los géneros apropiados que puedan acomodarlos como narrativas.

Por supuesto, esta esperanza de una narrativa futura podría ser ingenua. Parece que la narrativa es una de esas convenciones humanísticas que depende de la finitud que se sacrifica aún más con cada avance de la historia. Aunque incluso si admitimos que la narrativa está terminada y la enumeramos entre los géneros muertos de la historia, la pregunta es si se podría forjar algún otro género, lo que podría dar otro terreno a la subjetividad. Aquí es donde consideramos la división de sujetos entre roles activos y pasivos. Parece que los sujetos que están forjando activamente estos nuevos géneros, llamémoslos artistas por el estilo convencional, están tan absortos en el trabajo de la memoria que, desde la perspectiva de los observadores externos, parecen pasivos o incluso autistas. Entonces, tal vez haya una división entre los trabajadores que están forjando los nuevos géneros de subjetividad y los consumidores que probablemente serán constituidos por ellos.

Parece que esta idea de terminación podría considerarse un artefacto distinto de la intellegencia de Jena circa-1800. Los románticos allí habían inaugurado esta nueva idea de “literatura” a partir de un canon que unía a Dante, Shakespeare y Goethe con Jacob Boehme. Esta falsificación de un género da a la estética literaria una apertura radical al misticismo luterano. Esta síntesis particular de género es pasada por alto por los lectores católicos en Francia, que no pudieron apreciar la figuración de la alquimia en esta forma. Los lectores católicos tenían una tendencia a escolasticizar la dialéctica y leerla como teología negativa, por lo que se perdieron el humor cómico sanguíneo del pensamiento hegeliano. Esta crítica se aplica a la ironía de Pierre Klossowksi, junto con la austera neutralidad de Maurice Blanchot. El Hegel francés en el estado de ánimo de la conciencia infeliz, mientras reía mientras escribía en la arena.

Los filósofos siempre se ven afectados por el estado de ánimo que los rodea. A menudo se observaba cómo los pensadores alemanes tenían el beneficio de un distanciamiento político, ya que su estado imperial era algo distante y bastante vago. Mientras que los pensadores franceses e ingleses se enfrentaron más directamente a la realidad de los regímenes totalitarios, los filósofos alemanes fueron libres de soñar felizmente con la historia desde la distancia. Aunque, por supuesto, ese sueño nunca fue completamente imperturbable, y luego ocurrió algo así como un despertar completo con los nazis, donde la filosofía alemana se vio obligada a asumir la responsabilidad de las consecuencias de sus ideas.

Parece que cualquier situación puede implicar órdenes de responsabilidad sorprendentes. Esto depende del posicionamiento de los sujetos dentro de las instituciones de la sociedad. El historicismo crudo intenta extraer lecciones rápidas del pasado y asignar responsabilidades mapeando los eventos de la historia en el presente directamente como metáforas burdas. Este mapeo directo indica un automatismo irreflexivo, donde no hay nada espiritualmente vivo en lo contemporáneo. Simplemente están repitiendo alguna pesadilla de la historia que casi no tiene conexión con las circunstancias actuales. Por tanto, lo que yo llamo "historia moderada" tiene que distinguirse de ese tipo de automatismo. Este sería un centrismo liberal que responde intelectualmente a las circunstancias contemporáneas. Esta sería una libertad que se escapa del peso del recuerdo traumático sin caer en un capricho irresponsable.


Una agenda para moderados

Las ideas impulsan la historia. Pero no cualquier idea, ideas magnéticas. Ideas tan carismáticas que la gente les dedica la vida.

En su libro de 1999, "El verdadero sueño americano", Andrew Delbanco describió las diferentes ideas que, en diferentes etapas, impulsaron la historia de Estados Unidos. La primera etapa de nuestra historia fue impulsada por la fe en Dios. Los Peregrinos vinieron porque Dios los llamó a hacerlo. Los planes de Dios para la humanidad se completarían en este continente.

La segunda fase, hasta el siglo XIX, se organizó en torno a la Nación. Los pioneros se estaban asentando en Occidente. Fue la época del excepcionalismo estadounidense. América iba a ser una nación universal, un hogar y un modelo para toda la humanidad, la última y mejor esperanza de la tierra.

La tercera fase, desde 1960 hasta hoy, se organizó en torno al Yo. Cada individuo debe deshacerse de las limitaciones. La mejor vida fue la vida de máxima autoexpresión, autorrealización y máxima libertad personal, tanto económica como de estilo de vida.

Ahora estamos dejando la era del Ser. La derecha y la izquierda ofrecen ahora dos ideas magnéticas diferentes. La derecha trumpiana ofrece Tribe. “Nuestro” tipo de gente está amenazada por “su” tipo de gente. Necesitamos levantar muros, construir barreras y luchar. El nacionalismo estadounidense anterior se trataba de la frontera, se trata de la fortaleza. El tribalismo es una idea magnética que ha movilizado a la gente desde tiempos inmemoriales.

La izquierda ofrece la idea de Justicia Social. La izquierda cuenta historias de opresión. La historia de Estados Unidos es la historia de la opresión de clase, raza y género. La misión ahora es levantarse y destruir los sistemas de opresión. Esto también es una idea eléctrica.

El problema con las ideas de izquierda y derecha de hoy es que ambas se basan en una mentalidad de escasez. Se basan en nosotros / ellos, amigo / enemigo, la política es guerra, la vida es conflicto.

Ambos se basan en la fantasía de que la otra mitad de América puede ser conquistada, y cuando desaparece podemos conseguir todo lo que queremos. Ambos se basan en la idea de que si podemos concentrar suficiente poder en el estado autoritario centralizado, entonces podemos impulsar los cambios que buscamos.

Por eso, muchos de nosotros rechazamos estas dos ideas. Muchos de nosotros no queremos vivir en una sociedad de guerra, ya sea una guerra tribal o una guerra de clases. Si la elección de 2020 es entre Donald Trump y un demócrata que apoya el Green New Deal, votaría por cualquier alternativa moderada.

El problema con los moderados siempre ha sido que no tienen una idea magnética. La moderación reciente ha sido una papilla suave que se define a sí misma por lo que no le gusta.

No tiene por qué ser así.

¿Cuál es el problema central que enfrenta Estados Unidos hoy en día? Es la división: las crecientes brechas entre ricos y pobres, rurales y urbanos, educados y menos educados, blancos y negros, izquierda y derecha.

¿Qué gran idea contrarresta la división, la fragmentación, la alienación? Se encuentra en Levítico y Mateo: Ama a tu prójimo. La izquierda y la derecha de hoy están alimentadas por la ira y buscan el conflicto. La gran idea para los moderados debería ser la solidaridad, la fraternidad, la conversación a través de las diferencias. Una agenda moderada debería magnificar nuestro afecto mutuo.

There are four affections that bind our society, and moderates could champion a policy agenda for each:

We are bound together by our love of our children. The first mission is to promote policies to make sure children are enmeshed in webs of warm relationships: child tax credits, early childhood education, parental leave, schools that emphasize social and emotional learning.

We are bound to society by our work. The second mission is to help people find vocations through which they can serve the community: wage subsidies, apprenticeship tracks, subsidies to help people move to opportunity, work councils, which are clubs that would offer workers lifelong training and representation.

We are bound together by our affection for our place. The third mission is to devolve power out of Washington to the local level. Out-radicalize the left and right by offering a different system of power, a system in which power is wielded by neighbors, who know their local context and trust one another. Create a national service program so that young people are paid to serve organizations in their community.

We are bound together by our shared humanity. The fourth mission is to embrace an immigration policy that balances welcome with cultural integration. It’s to champion housing and education policies that encourage racial integration. Neither left nor right talks much about racial integration anymore. But it is the prerequisite for national unity.

Moderation is not an ideology it is a way of being. It stands for humility of the head and ardor in the heart. When you listen to your neighbor, you see how many perspectives there are and you’re intellectually humble in the face of that pluralism. When you listen to your neighbor, you see that deep down we’re the same and you hunger to deepen that connection.

Let the left and right stand for endless political war. The moderate seeks the beloved community. That, too, is a magnetic idea.


Mitt the Moderate: An Alternate Campaign History

This might be a different presidential campaign if Mitt Romney's spokesmen weren't so often clarifying things their candidate has said. If only Romney were allowed to say things in interviews without his staff correcting them, as they did when Romney said he'd keep some parts of Obamacare Sunday, pundits would not be talking about how Romney is still working to "shore up his base" but about his move to the center for the general election. (Some conservatives think Romney has the opposite problem -- he's too Democrat Lite.) But let's play "what if" for a moment: What if all those clarifications never happened? What if, after tacking to the right in the primary, Romney did what George W. Bush did before him and tack back to the center for the general? Indeed, one way he did that in his re-election campaign was by giving Romney and other then-moderates prime speaking spots at the 2004 convention as the Boston Globe reported then, "Massachusetts Republicans with moderate positions on most social issues, Romney and [Lt. Gov. Kerry] Healey also fit into the moderate tone that the Bush campaign wants to project for its convention."

RELATED:First Presidential Debate Gave Fact-Checkers a Lot of Homework

Tacking to the center was what many people expected Romney to do, too, only a few months ago. His own adviser, Eric Fehrnstrom, admitted as much when he compared the campaign to an Etch-A-Sketch. In the uproar that ensued, National Journal's Jim O'Sullivan noted "that a freshly nominated candidate. would tack to the center.  is a hardly a novel political strategy for the general election." In December, former Oklahoma Gov. Frank Keating said despite Newt Gingrich and Romney taking conservative positions in the debates, "Both of them could tack center-right." In March, BuzzFeed's Ben Smith said on CNN that Romney "would like to tack to the center. His advisers are saying, you know what, this thing is over we're inevitable. And for the same reason that we're weak among Republicans, the independents are going to love us." In April, Obama's linking of Romney to Paul Ryan's budget made "it tougher for Mr. Romney to tack to the center once he gets past the primaries," The New York Times said. A moderate Mitt in the general was a given. We indulged in some counterfactual history and wondered what the race would have been like so far if he had done so. Here's a guide to the Romney campaign that could have been before all of the clarifications.

RELATED:Long Lost Emails Show Just How Much Romney Loved the Individual Mandate

Inmigración

June 29: Romney says he supports the Dream Act. "For those that are here as the children of those that came here illegally, I want to make sure they have a permanent answer to what their status will be," Romney told Newsmax. "And I've indicated in my view that those who serve in the military and have advanced degrees would certainly qualify for that kind of permanence." The Dream Act allows kids who came here illegally and served in the military or went to college to become citizens, but Romney had previously only supported the military part, not the college part. 

RELATED:Romney Is Practically Begging Obama to Talk About Taxes

Alternate campaign: Romney, softening some of his immigration positions he took during the Republican primary, maybe improves his standing of㺝 percent Latinos' voters. Republicans would be less worried about his immigration positions. Polls care a lot more about the economy than immigration, but they overwhelmingly support the Dream Act.

Real campaign: Romney spokesman Ryan Williams issues a statement saying Romney "simply misspoke in this interview." Romney supports more visas for high-skilled workers, so that's what he was referring to in the "advanced degrees" part of his quote.

Impuestos

August 23: Romney says he's looking out for the little guy. “Big business is doing fine in many places – they get the loans they need, they can deal with all the regulation. They know how to find ways to get through the tax code, save money by putting various things in the places where there are low tax havens around the world for their businesses," he said at a Minnesota fundraiser.

RELATED:Rubio Defers His Dream Act

Alternate campaign: Romney uses this moment to cast off the Obama campaign's caricature of him as a robber baron who hates the poor and middle class. He backs letting the Bush tax cuts expire for the wealthy but insists we need more tax cuts for the middle class. He takes the opportunity to offer more details to rebut the Tax Policy Center's finding that his plan raises taxes on the middle class.

Real campaign: Romney's spokesman Andrea Saul clarifies, "Governor Romney has long said we need to simplify the tax code, close loopholes, and create a more level playing field for American businesses. Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan will be champions for small business, encouraging investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation." Romney promises to lower tax rates but close loopholes so he's not really lowering rates on the rich. But Citizens for Tax Justice says that's "impossible."

Aborto

August 27: Romney breaks from the Republican Party -- and his own running mate -- saying he favors legal abortion in cases where the mother's health is threatened. "My position has been clear throughout this campaign," Romney told CBS News. "I'm in favor of abortion being legal in the case of rape and incest, and the health and life of the mother." Pro-lifers say health of the mother would allow too many abortions, as when Paul Ryan said "the health exception is a loophole wide enough to drive a Mack truck through it."

RELATED:Romney Ruined a Perfectly Good Moment for Righteous Outrage

Alternate campaign: Romney sticks with this comment, and Democrats can't draw as strong a contrast with all their speeches at their convention about abortion rights. Republicans perhaps ease the gender gap a little. Women are more pro-choice than men, but the gap on the abortion issue is smaller than the one between Democrats and Republicans.

Real campaign: Romney spokeswoman Andrea Saul emailed El Washington Post that afternoon, clarifying, “Gov. Romney’s position is clear: he opposes abortion except for cases of rape, incest and where the life of the mother is threatened.” No health exception.

Obamacare

September 9: Romney says he backs the most popular parts of Obamacare. "Of course there are a number of things that I like in health care reform that I'm going to put in place," he said on Conoce a la prensa. ''One is to make sure that those with pre-existing conditions can get coverage."

Alternate campaign: Romney takes credit for passing health care as governor in Massachusetts and offers a health plan to help him cut into Obama's 15-point advantage on health care.

Real campaign: Later Sunday night, Romney's staff clarified to Revisión nacional that he supported coverage for people with pre-existing conditions who had continuous coverage, which was basically the law before Obamacare. It means that insurance has to cover you if you have a pre-existing condition and have always had insurance. If you dropped your insurance for a little while, you're screwed.

Of course, what could have been was widely thought what would be. Romney has been running for president for nearly six years now, and for a long time those who argued his potential as a presidential candidate focused on his ability to win over blue-state voters to the Republican line. Way back in February 2007, Noemie Emery wrote at The Weekly Standard, "Urbane and urban, Romney comes from Massachusetts by way of Michigan, won as a Republican in what is perhaps the most liberal state in the Union, and has quartered his campaign in the North End of Boston, as far from the Sunbelt as is humanly possible." A National Journal poll of Republican insiders published December 1, 2007 included this insider's comment: "The only hope for reducing the level of partisanship in Washington would be the election of a president like [Barack] Obama or [Mitt] Romney, who have shown an ability to transcend the partisan divide." Mulling over his fizzled 2008 primary effort, Politico noted that Romney "has a compelling story of having been a Republican governor in a 'blue' state who can bridge the divide of Washington." The ability for Romney to go moderate was also the reason, frequently cited through last fall, that Romney was reportedly the Republican that Obama feared the most. Some even speculated Romney could turn Northeastern states purple. "As solid centrists," the Globe and Mail wrote of Romney and Jon Huntsman, "they are the Republicans most likely to appeal to independent voters." That view has been clarified. A moderate Mitt isn't just an alternate history. At one point, it was supposed to be the future.


Experiencia americana

Courtesy: Corbis

The case of Comandante Huber Matos, sentenced by Fidel Castro's regime to 20 years in prison for "acts of sedition and treason" only nine months after the rebel victory, signaled a breakdown in the revolutionary coalition and the demise of the "moderates" in Cuba's revolutionary government. "That is the moment when the radical allies say 'this is the way we are going and not even those who fought with us can say no,'" asserts Professor Bill Leogrande.

Anti-Batista Rebel
Huber Matos, a schoolteacher and rice grower from the town of Manzanillo, in Cuba's Oriente province, came from modest middle class beginnings. Like Fidel Castro, Matos was a member of a political party, Partido Ortodoxo, that was opposed to the government of Fulgencio Batista. Matos went on to become a member of the 26th of July Movement urban underground, and later joined Castro's rebel army in the Sierra Maestra. In the mountains, he earned the rank of comandante, and in January 1959, rode into Havana next to Castro atop a tank. That same year, on October 19, Matos wrote Castro a letter resigning his command, citing his concern with the growing influence of Communists in Cuba's revolutionary government.

In His Own Words
The story of Matos's political decisions is best told in his own words. When Batista usurped power in a coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, most Cubans initially reacted with indifference. Huber Matos was among the few who took to the streets in the immediate aftermath:

"Batista's coup was an insult. I saw it as a situation that required a response. The next day I joined students and workers in a demonstration -- in an effort to try to prevent Batista from consolidating power."

Moncada and Afterward
On July 26, 1953, Castro's guerrillas stormed a military base at the Moncada barracks. Batista's brutal response catapulted Castro to a role of leadership in the struggle against the government. Matos considered whether to join with the new rebel hero:

"Moncada had just happened. Fidel was already in prison, and I was involved in conspiracies against Batista. Celia Sánchez approached me. 'Listen,' she said, 'we have to strike an alliance with Fidel. He is the man, we have to forget all other conspiracies and join Fidel.' I, along with others in Santiago de Cuba, had some reservations. Fidel had led a daring assault, but he didn't go into Moncada, and he'd managed to save himself. But a lot of the young men who had joined the 26th of July had been my students, so on the one hand was Celia, on the other hand the boys. until the landing of the Granma when I decided to join the 26th of July Movement. From that moment on, I collaborated with the rebels in the Sierra . sending arms, medicines, and fighters, while maintaining my cover as a teacher and as a businessman. But in April 1957 I was discovered and apprehended. I escaped miraculously, went underground, and then left for Costa Rica with the dream of obtaining weapons for the insurrection."

Arrival in the Sierra Maestra
After ten months in Costa Rica, Matos landed in the Sierra Maestra on March 31, 1958 with a planeload of weapons, obtained with the help of Costa Rican president José Figueres, a man committed to the promotion of democratic government in Latin America. Matos recalled:

"I landed on the Sierra with more than five tons of weapons and munitions. Fidel was jumping with joy -- literally. He fired into the night. Spent I don't know how many bullets firing all those weapons. like a child who wakes up on Christmas Day. 'Now we really won the war,' Fidel rejoiced. 'With these weapons we can finish them.'"

Guerrilla Comandante
On August 8, 1958, Fidel Castro awarded Huber Matos the rank of comandante. Matos remembered Castro's remarks on that day:

"Once we finish this war, [Castro said], the military commanders cannot occupy political positions. We have to remain the moral guardians of the revolution. Our duty is to ensure that the promises to the people are kept."

"Our primary objective was to reestablish democracy, and I saw that the people, the young people who joined the rebel army, embodied this urge of all Cubans to return to democratic rule. But, at the same time, the revolution began to nurture itself with new ideas. In addition to reestablishing democracy, let's adopt economic and social reforms to benefit the Cuban people -- agrarian reform, urban reform, all within the rule of law."

"I'd noticed Fidel was a rash, very temperamental man with despotic tendencies. At night in my hammock I would ask myself, 'what will happen in the future?' But then I would see the captains, the other comandantes, obey Fidel and admire him so. I would ask myself, 'am I the only one who doubts?'"

Victory
On Victory Day in January 1959, Comandante Huber Matos entered Havana a hero, standing next to Fidel Castro:

"For the rebels, it came as a surprise. We didn't think we could defeat Batista's army so easily. we were euphoric, and felt the spiritual satisfaction of someone who has fulfilled his duty selflessly."

Leadership and Suspicions
By January 11, 1959, Matos had been named military governor of the province of Camagüey. The rebel cabinet included: president, Manuel Urrutia Lleó prime minister, José Miró Cardona president of the Central Bank, Felize Pazos minister of construction, Manuel Ray and other prominent Cubans who were not members of the rebel army. Fidel remained head of the rebel army. But real power resided with Fidel and a new powerful institution, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, an arm of the rebel army. Within a month, on February 16, 1959, Fidel Castro became prime minister, violating his own mandate that none of the comandantes would assume political posts. In this Cold War era, Communism was extremely controversial, a belief system hated by many in the West. By March, Huber Matos was alarmed to see signs of Communist penetration in the Cuban armed forces:

"In late March and early April I found pro-Marxist propaganda in Verde Olivo, a magazine distributed to the armed forces. one, two, three articles. And we were seeing [Che Guevara circulating with the leadership of the Cuban Communist party, and Raúl [Castro, Fidel's brother] having meetings with them, naming some Communists to his general staff, and I told myself, 'There is a second plan being put in place here.' But every time I brought it up to Fidel, he would say, 'No, no, no, I will not betray my commitment to Cuban history.'"

Doubts and Treason
By July, Castro had accused President Urrutia of "actions bordering treason" and replaced him with Osvaldo Dorticós, an obscure lawyer who was blindly loyal to Fidel. Matos sent a letter of resignation to Castro, expressing his doubts about the course of the revolution. On July 26 -- the anniversary of Moncada -- more than a million people, including thousands of peasants, gathered in Havana to celebrate the proclamation of the Agrarian Reform Law. Matos recalled Castro's comments:

"Fidel received me at the Hilton Hotel. He was very affectionate. 'Your resignation is not acceptable at this point. We still have too much work to do,' he said. 'I admit that Raúl and Che are flirting with Marxism. but you have the situation under control. Forget about resigning. But if in a while you believe the situation is not changing, you have the right to resign.'"

Resignación
In September 1959, Matos came to a decision. The moderate, democratic government he had hoped for and supported did not appear to be in Cuba's future. El escribio:

"Communist influence in the government has continued to grow. I have to leave power as soon as possible. I have to alert the Cuban people as to what is happening."

On October 19, 1959, Matos sent Castro a second letter of resignation, writing, "I don't want to become an obstacle to the revolution, and believe the honorable and revolutionary option is to step down." He would later say, "I did not want to provoke a conflict. I wanted to separate myself from power and to be left alone. I could foresee not only the coming of a dictatorship but one with Communist leanings. I believed that was obvious, and I couldn't betray my own convictions."

Traitor
Fidel Castro publicly branded Huber Matos a traitor on October 21, 1959, and sent Comandante Camilo Cienfuegos, one of the Cuba's most popular leaders, to arrest Matos. That same day, Castro's former air force chief, Pedro Díaz Lanz, flew to Havana from Miami, dropping leaflets calling on Castro to eliminate the Communists from his regime. Five days later, at a massive demonstration "in support of the Revolution and against the traitors," Fidel asked for a show of hands in favor of the execution of Díaz Lanz, safely back in Miami, and Huber Matos, being held at La Cabaña. The response was a unanimous Paredón -- "to the wall." Then Castro called a government meeting to discuss Matos's fate. Raúl Castro and Che Guevara favored execution. Three key ministers, Manuel Ray, Faustino Pérez and Felipe Pazos, questioned Castro's version of events and were immediately replaced by men loyal to Castro. It signaled the end of the revolutionary coalition. The reins of power were firmly in Castro's hands. In a surprising turn, he decided not to execute Matos, saying, "I don't want to turn him into a martyr."

Trial and Sentence
On December 11, 1959, Matos' trial began. "The trial lasted five days, if we can call it a trial," he would remember. "It was more like a court martial. Late in the afternoon before the first day I was handed a pile of papers. That was when I first saw that I was being charged with 'Treason and Sedition.'" Within four days, Matos -- the rebel who had stood at Castro's side through the late 1950s -- had been sentenced to 20 years in prison. Most of those years would be served at the Isle of Pines, where Castro spent 22 months between 1953 and 1955. Matos' imprisonment was an ordeal:

"Prison was a long agony from which I emerged alive because of God's will. I had to go on hunger strikes, mount other types of protests. Terrible. On and off, I spent a total of sixteen years in solitary confinement, constantly being told that I was never going to get out alive, that I had been sentenced to die in prison. They were very cruel, to the fullest extent of the word. I was tortured on several occasions, [I] was subjected to all kinds of horrors, all kinds, including the puncturing of my genitals. Once during a hunger strike a prison guard tried to crush my stomach with his boot. Terrible things."

Liberación
Huber Matos was released from prison, on October 21, 1979 — having served every day of his sentence. He joined his wife and his four children, who had left Cuba in 1963, in exile in Miami, where the family now resides.


The Fall – and Possible Rise – of Moderate Republicanism

The 1960s are remembered as a decade of political turmoil — student demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, political assassinations, and urban unrest — but the decade also gave rise to a moderate Republican movement that attracted many politically interested young people. In 1962, I was one of the co-founders of the Ripon Society, which quickly became an influential and important voice of moderate Republicanism. We had members in chapters throughout the country, our statements and white papers attracted major media attention, and we ultimately played an important role in developing many of the domestic policies of President Nixon’s administration.

In the end, we lost the battle for the soul of the Republican Party. But our experience has some lessons for moderates today.

I was first drawn to the Republican Party, as a teenager in my native state of Connecticut, because of President Dwight Eisenhower. The Party’s ethic and style in the 1960s were very much those of Eisenhower himself: civility, tolerance, and the ability to build strong coalitions across partisan, ideological, and social lines through negotiation and compromise. As I grew older, I became interested in the Republican Party’s role in American history. I viewed “Republicanism” as a uniquely American approach to public issues and a set of experiences and values demonstrated by Republican leaders though a century or more of political activity. Most strongly, of course, I was inspired by the party’s foremost leader, Abraham Lincoln, and his legacy of freedom and equal opportunity for all Americans.

I wrote my senior honors thesis at Wesleyan University on the traditions of moderate, reform-oriented Republicanism, including the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt at another moment of political, social, and economic transformation for the nation. As a Fulbright Scholar in the United Kingdom in the year after my college graduation, I studied the British Conservative Party and its relevance to American politics. I became particularly interested in the Bow Group, an organization of young Conservative professional and academic reformers who had substantially influenced Tory policies. When I returned to the United States to begin law school, I joined with a number of other graduate and professional students in and around Cambridge and Boston to form the Ripon Society, which we quite consciously modeled after the British Conservative Party Bow Group.

One of our principal motivations was the sense that many American thought leaders viewed the Republican Party, in the words of John Stuart Mill, as the “stupid party,” and that we needed a moderate Republican group to counteract that image. In the urban and university environments where the Ripon Society was born and grew in the early 1960s, there was a strong sense that Republicans could not be bold and innovative or even relevant to the national policy dialogue. Most of us in the Ripon Society were natural contrarians, and we set out to overcome this view of the Republican Party. In so doing, we hoped to attract to the party a younger and more diverse constituency.

Our other motivation was our strong and outspoken commitment to civil rights, to greater opportunities for all Americans, and to dismantling the segregation of the American South. At that time, virtually all of the members of Congress from the South, who defended this pattern of “Jim Crow” laws and segregation, were Democrats. We saw support of civil rights as a Republican tradition, and we sought to bring Lincoln’s values of freedom and national unity to bear on the civil rights struggles of the ‘60s and ‘70s.

There was always a debate within the Ripon Society about whether our role was to focus on analysis and policy development or to become political activists. To some extent, Ripon Society members did both, and several Ripon “alumni” went on to political careers. But the Ripon Society never established a substantial grassroots network of moderate Republican activists. Instead, our main collective effort was to apply hard research and analysis to public issues, based on the founding principles of the Republican Party and the Lincoln tradition.

At the core of Lincoln’s belief system, as I came to understand it, was the Declaration of Independence and its revolutionary ideals of liberty and equal opportunity. Lincoln saw emancipation and the end of slavery as a “new birth of freedom” for America and the completion of the unfinished mission of the Founders. Lincoln’s nationalism, while profound, was not the nativist, “blood and soil,” anti-immigrant variety of Donald Trump. Liberty and union were inseparable, Lincoln said in 1856. He believed that the purpose of the terrible civil war through which he led the nation was to preserve the values of a liberal and democratic society.

The Ripon Society demonstrated its commitment to the Republican heritage by taking its name from the Wisconsin town where the party had been born. Establishing new chapters in other urban centers, particularly in the Northeast, the Ripon Society focused its research and policy development on a range of domestic issues, but the most important of these was civil rights. Nothing seemed more true to Lincoln’s values and to the historic origins of the Republican Party than completing the journey toward equality before the law on which the party had been founded. The Ripon Society was able to support in significant ways the critical efforts of Republican House and Senate members in the passage of the landmark civil and voting rights legislation in the 1960s. Indeed, proportionally more Republicans than Democrats voted for those bills, and without Republican support, they never would have been enacted.

When the Ripon Society was founded in the early 1960s, the Republican Party was still strongly influenced by the centrist and bipartisan pragmatism of the Eisenhower years. It was a “big tent” coalition of diverse philosophical elements. There was a strong strand of political moderation within the Republican Party, and there were pragmatic leaders at top levels of the party who were welcoming to the Ripon Society’s work.

However, the 1960s also marked the beginnings of the conservative ideological transformation of the Republican Party, a shift that ultimately tested Ripon’s mission. During these years the influence of self-described and consciously identified conservatives, such as William Buckley Jr. and other writers and intellectuals, was growing, and the party was beginning to experience a shift in its grassroots base as well.

These trends first became evident when Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater gained the party’s presidential nomination at the 1964 Republican National Convention in San Francisco. Ripon’s members disagreed with Goldwater’s conservative positions on Social Security, national security, and other issues, but at the heart of our opposition to the Goldwater nomination was his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That was a moment of truth and testing for Senator Goldwater on a matter where the Ripon Society believed that the party had to uphold its Republican and Lincolnian traditions and values.

Goldwater’s landslide defeat dragged down many other Republican candidates in 1964. In our book, From Disaster to Distinction, the Ripon Society argued that the Republican Party had to respond to this electoral defeat by becoming more of a “big tent” and by developing and articulating new ideas. Our white papers and policy analyses during the 1960s attracted considerable and generally favorable media attention and advanced realistic alternatives to national problems that we believed avoided the bureaucratic overreach of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.

The Ripon Society’s ideas and people made significant contributions to the often overlooked innovative and progressive proposals of the Nixon administration in such policy areas as health care, revenue sharing, welfare reform, an end to the military draft, and environmental protection. Virtually all of these ideas became part of the Nixon program. The Ripon Society had also supported a negative income tax for the working poor that was close to what became Nixon’s Family Assistance proposal.

But, of course, the Nixon administration also marked the decline of moderates within the Republican Party, as well as the party’s demographic realignment away from its historic roots in the Northeast and Midwest. That became evident with Nixon’s “silent majority” campaign in 1968 and his welcoming of the steady flight of conservative Southern Democrats to the Republican Party after the passage of the civil and voting rights legislation in the 1960s. The geographic core of the party continued to move south and west. The party’s conservative direction became more obvious with the near-defeat of President Gerald Ford at the 1976 Republican National Convention and was solidified by the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

The founding principles of the Republican Party, associated with Lincoln the strands of progressive Republicanism represented by Theodore Roosevelt and the engagement of many centrist Republican leaders through the 20 th century — all of these continued to play a role in the policies and programs pursued by the party during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and of both Bushes. However, those who saw themselves as conservatives, more than as Republicans, dominated Republican thought and action during these years. It amounted to a takeover of a political party by an ideological movement. Conservatives constructed an organizational and intellectual infrastructure of influence and party control that was not matched by the party’s remaining moderates.

The sweeping victory of the Newt Gingrich-led Republicans in the 1994 midterm congressional elections solidified these trends within the party. The ’94 elections propelled Republicans more firmly toward establishing the party’s base in the South and in the rural areas and small cities and towns of the nation and toward adopting the social and cultural beliefs of evangelical Protestants and other conservative Christians as party policies.

Perhaps as significant, Gingrich’s scorched-earth, zero-sum style of leadership was destructive of the ethics and practices of big-tent, coalition-based politics. His denunciations of negotiation and of legislative compromise were inconsistent with the pragmatic politics of centrist congressional Republicans and, arguably, at odds with many of the ideological principles of conservative Republicans.

After 1994, the Republican Party was fundamentally changed. Ever since the “Gingrich revolution” there has seemed little place for the values associated with the moderate and progressive strands within the party’s ideology. Opportunities for the individuals who hold these views to serve as party leaders and candidates have diminished.

It is surprising how little moderate resistance there was to the conservative takeover. There was a flurry of activity around the presidential campaigns during the 1970s, but that essentially ended with the Reagan election. Moderates who continued to work for the Republican Party gradually accepted what seemed to be the inexorable wave of conservatism and adapted to that new reality. And some prominent moderates ended up joining the conservative ranks.

Donald Trump’s nomination and election in 2016 have been portrayed as the fruition of the ideological and demographic trends within the Republican Party over the last three or four decades. In reality, though, Trump’s presidency represents a rejection of ambos conservative ideology y the pragmatic moderation, closely associated with Lincoln and rooted in the party’s historic values, with which the Ripon Society had identified.

In no sense can it be said that Donald Trump’s presidency is a Republican one, and there is little evidence that it will become so during his time in office. Trump’s disdain for the rule of law, constitutional checks and balances, and limits on executive power is a far cry from both historic Republican principles and classic conservative beliefs. Under Trump, appeals to division have replaced an instinct for unity, and the exercise of personal power has replaced respect for democratic norms and institutional integrity.

Can “Republicanism,” the set of principles that brought me to the party a half-century ago, be reconciled with the personality cult that the Republican Party has become under Donald Trump? How applicable is the past to the present and the future of the party? Do the fundamental and historic principles and values of Lincoln and of the founders of the Republican Party have any meaning and application to its current circumstances? And do the history and experiences of the Ripon Society have any bearing on these questions?

In the short run, there seems little incentive for those who hold elective or appointive public office as Republicans to assert positions and principles contrary to those identified with Trump. Most Republicans are too fearful of Trump’s power to assert positions inconsistent with his.

But in the long run, if the Republican Party is to sustain a competitive position in American politics, it will have to regain influence with younger generations of voters. The generational divide, augmented by the growing diversity of the electorate, is the greatest challenge to a post-Trump Republican Party.

The Trump strategy — which is almost certainly instinctive rather than deliberate — has centered on building overwhelming support among older whites (particularly men) living in exurban and rural areas, in small cities and towns, in Southern and Mountain/Plains states, and the Rust Belt, who feel culturally and/or economically threatened. This strategy obviously has been successful for him and may well lead him to a second term.

Demographically, however, the Trump approach does not seem sustainable. Time inevitably will take its toll on a shrinking Trump coalition. This will hold significant implications — if not for Trump in 2020, then certainly for his successors and for the Republican Party.

The values of the majority of young Americans seem clear: They seek education, skills, and opportunities to rise and prosper. They are attracted to the growing major metropolitan regions of the country that are centers of innovation and of the emerging (often information-related) sectors of the American economy. They are open to international engagement, enthusiastic about diversity, tolerant of differences, and committed to justice.

Freedom, opportunity, and equality comprised the core of Lincoln’s beliefs and were the principal motivations for the establishment of the Republican Party. Lincoln held that the role of government was to assure opportunity for all Americans and guarantee equal protection before the law: Government was to be limited, but effective, and power, to be dispersed and restrained. For Lincoln, as for the Founding Fathers, these core principles, inherent in the birth of the United States, made its survival essential to the future of liberal democracy everywhere. Certainly these values have resonance with younger Americans, whose connection to the future Republican Party will be essential to its survival and influence.

One of the surprises of the Trump era for me, personally, has been the discovery of common ground between moderates, such as myself, and principled “movement conservatives” with whom I have disputed for years. We have found a shared commitment to the historic Republican and Lincolnian values of freedom, equality, and opportunity that motivated the Ripon Society and to the conservative principles of limited government and constrained executive power, the rule of law, the dispersion of authority to the levels of government closest to the people, and a belief in strong families and communities.

These values are threatened by the Trump presidency, but seem essential to the long-term survival of the Republican Party. The re-assertion of these shared and historic principles can allow a restored Republican Party to establish a position among new and emerging generations of Americans, rather than to rely upon those who are resistant to, and fearful of, change. However, the principles that motivate the Party must be given form and substance through realistic and relevant policies and programs that are responsive to the goals and interests of young people and to rapidly changing economic social, cultural, and environmental conditions.

The experience of the Ripon Society – and particularly its insistence on giving contemporary life to core founding principles, its dedication to hard policy analysis and development, and its commitment to institutional reform — seem directly relevant to this task. The Ripon Society provided “safe space” within the Republican Party for young and emerging professionals, managers, and academics to undertake fact- and evidence-based inquiries and analyses of public issues, which blended idealism with realism. By replicating this model with new organizational activities, the Republican Party can perhaps establish a strong base among new generations of civic and political leaders.

Elements of such a uniquely 21 st Century Republican program might include:

  • Pursuing the expansion, rather than the suppression, of voting rights
  • Committing to a civic nationalism and pride that is founded on the uniqueness and the exceptionalism of the American experience, that is, a nation based on laws and institutions, and on democratic rule
  • Promoting equality of opportunity for all Americans through expanding education and training, nurturing a competitive and fair market, while curbing its excesses, and rooting out discrimination and corruption wherever they appear
  • Exercising stewardship of the environment, including taking all appropriate steps to mitigate and adapt to the catastrophic risks of climate change and
  • Limiting the role of government and executive authority, but supporting government’s power to protect its citizens through careful and balanced regulation.

But neither historic principles nor relevant policies and programs, alone, will assure a rebirth of this brand of Republicanism among America’s rising generations. After all, this is a political as well as a philosophic task, and, while the tools and techniques are different today from the 1850s and 1860s, when the Republican Party was born and shaped around these values, the challenge to reach and persuade remains.

New forms of media and communication must be developed and used by those who would rebuild the Republican Party after the faux populism of a Trump-dominated Party has ended. We can learn from the quiet, methodical approach of the “movement conservatives,” who infiltrated and took over the Republican Party in the last third of the 20 th Century. We can learn from the realistic but effective tactics that enabled the Democrats to win the House of Representatives in 2018.

This is a message of hope, if not optimism. Creative policies and effective means of communication and mobilization, both adapted to the times in which we live, but grounded on enduring, historic principles, can revive a modern version of Lincoln Republicanism. The essential values that Lincoln espoused remain as relevant today, as they were during the agony of the Civil War and its aftermath. They need to be restored as the core of the party that he helped to establish and sustain.


Moderate Republican

A Moderate Republican is someone who rejects some conservative positions, most notably on social issues such as abortion and homosexuality. Moderate Republicans often support each other rather than conservative candidates and typically reject conservative positions in the Republican Party platform.

During the 1960s, the moderate/liberal wing of the Republican Party was referred to by conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly as the Eastern Establishment. [1] [2] Moderate Republicans from that era included senators Jacob Javits of New York, Thomas Kuchel of California, and governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York.

Four examples of moderate Republicans are former Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine and sitting Senators Susan Collins, also of Maine, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, and the retiring Bob Corker of Tennessee. Some might also classify John McCain as a moderate Republican though he has had a largely conservative voting record.

In some states, the rift between moderate and conservative Republicans has become such that Republican primaries almost overshadow the general elections in importance. An example is Kansas, which is a very conservative state that is dominated by the state Republican Party that has factionalized into moderate and conservative wings. The same was even true in Mississippi in the 2014 Senate election there.

Republicans who support traditional conservative positions on social issues but not on economic issues are not typically described as moderate Republicans. For example, in the 2000 Republican presidential primaries Gary Bauer called for an increase in the minimum wage, opposed Social Security reform, and called for curtailed free trade, especially with China. Yet, he was not considered a moderate Republican.


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